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techniques	 to	 pursue	 wider	 objectives.
3
	 Much	 of	 the	 international	 debate	 around	 this	









sustained	 over	 time.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 judicial	 review	 in	 the	 UK,	 traditional	 funding	 for	




























Epp,	 The	 Rights	 Revolution:	 Lawyers,	 Activists,	 and	 Supreme	 Courts	 in	 Comparative	 Perspective	 (Chicago:	
University	of	Chicago	Press,	1998).	














In	 this	 article,	 it	 is	 considered	 whether	 crowdfunding	 is	 a	 possible	 answer	 to	 the	
increasing	scarcity	of	traditional	resources	in	the	context	of	PIL	in	the	UK.	In	other	words,	can	
crowdfunding	 support	 reform	through	 the	provision	of	 resources	 for	PIL?	The	question	of	
whether	this	mode	of	litigation	funding	ought	to	be	encouraged	or	whether	it	is	problematic	







	 The	 analysis	 in	 this	 article	 has	 four	main	 parts.	 The	 first	 part	 explains	 the	 present	
funding	context	for	judicial	review	in	the	UK.	It	is	imperative	this	context	is	understood	as	it	
provides	 the	 conditions	 in	which	 crowdfunding	has	 grown.	The	 second	part	of	 this	 article	
introduces	how	crowdfunding	works,	how	it	has	become	increasingly	relied-upon	as	a	method	
for	funding	judicial	review	cases,	who	the	key	actors	are,	and	examples	of	crowdfunding	in	
action.	 The	 third	 part	 considers	 the	 main	 benefits	 and	 risks	 of	 the	 increased	 role	 that	
crowdfunding	is	playing	in	the	UK.	The	final	part	of	this	article	sets	out	the	case	for	developing	
















and	 legal	 techniques	as	an	 instrument	 for	obtaining	wider	 collective	objectives.	This	may	simply	 involve	 the	
settle	of	legal	questions	and	need	not	be	informed	by	any	ideology.	



























































	 Ministry	 of	 Justice,	 “Judicial	 review	 consultation–Press	 Release”	 (13	 December	 2012),	
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/judicial-review-consultation	[Accessed	February	22,	2018].	







































	 Legal	 aid	 grants	 come	with	 a	 level	 of	 costs	 protection	 too.	 Before	 the	 event	 insurance	 policies	 (typically	




















from	 the	 defendant,	 but	must	 instead	 be	 paid	 by	 the	 claimant.	 Given	 the	 non-monetary	
nature	of	judicial	review,	the	prospect	of	paying	a	success	fee	often	makes	a	CFA	expensive	
and	unattractive.	For	this	reason,	many	judicial	review	claimants	will	only	be	able	to	proceed	
if	 they	 can	 agree	 a	 particular	 type	 of	 CFA	 commonly	 known	 as	 a	 “CFA-Lite”.	 This	 is	 an	
agreement	which	limits	the	costs	payable	to	the	solicitor	to	the	amount	of	costs	that	may	be	
recovered	 from	the	other	 side	 (which	 the	claimant	has	 to	agree	 to	pursue),	and	does	not	
require	the	claimant	to	pay	the	lawyers	a	success	fee.	If	the	case	is	successful	and	an	 inter	

































for	payment.	 If	agreement	on	 the	size	of	 the	bill	 cannot	be	 reached,	 the	solicitors	 for	 the	
receiving	party	can	commence	assessment	proceedings	to	get	the	bill	assessed	by	the	court.	
Eligibility	 for	 legal	 aid	 is	 governed	by	 legislation,	 the	provisions	 and	 applications	of	which	












In	 the	 context	of	 judicial	 review,	Hickman	has	argued	powerfully	 that	 they	are	part	of	 an	








is,	 in	 large	 part,	 because	 of	 substantial	 restrictions	 on	 the	 scope	 of	 legal	 aid	 and	 the	
application	of	 the	means	test.
28
	For	Hickman,	 the	ground-level	 reality	 is	 that	“people	who	
have	£169.15	or	more	per	week	for	themselves	and	their	family	to	live	off,	or	who	have	any	
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significant	 assets,	 do	 not	 qualify	 for	 legal	 aid.”
29
	 Added	 to	 this,	 the	 government	 also	
introduced	a	"no	permission,	no	fee"	arrangement,	where	representatives	only	get	fees	for	
legal	 aid	 work	 at	 permission	 stage	 if	 the	 application	 is	 granted.
30







Hickman’s	 analysis—and	 its	 characterisation	of	 access	 to	 judicial	 review	as	 a	 “disgrace”—
struck	a	chord	with	practitioners,	both	in	portraying	the	role	of	legal	aid	in	judicial	review	and	
highlighting	 the	wider	 issue	of	 costs.	Assessing	 the	precise	 size	of	 the	problem	 is	 difficult	
without	 clear	 empirical	 data.
32




cases	 from	2006	 to	2017.	Table	2	 shows	data	 taken	 from	 the	Administrative	Court	COINS	



































Year	 Number	of	judicial	reviews	 Number	of	judicial	reviews	with	legal	aid	 As	a	%	
2000	 4238	 1163	 27.44%	
2001	 4722	 1733	 36.70%	
2002	 5372	 1586	 29.52%	
2003	 5938	 1938	 32.64%	
2004	 4200	 913	 21.74%	
2005	 5356	 930	 17.36%	
2006	 6421	 1077	 16.77%	
2007	 6684	 921	 13.78%	
2008	 7093	 1024	 14.44%	
2009	 9098	 1440	 15.83%	
2010	 10553	 1340	 12.70%	
2011	 11360	 799	 7.03%	
2012	 12429	 1246	 10.02%	
2013	 15594	 933	 5.98%	
2014	 4065	 240	 5.90%	
2015	 4679	 205	 4.38%	






hostile	 environment	 than	before;	 the	 key	 funding	 variables	 are	 shifting.	Certainly,	 various	





                                                
34
	The	longer	history	of	funding	for	judicial	reviews	is,	of	course,	a	more	complex	story.	




A	relatively	 recent	phenomenon	 is	 the	possibility	of	 raising	money	 for	 litigation	via	online	
crowdfunding	 platforms.	 Crowdfunding	 in	 general	 has	 risen	 in	 prominence	 across	 the	UK	













government,	and	so	was	 the	use	of	crowdfunding	specifically.	 In	2012,	 to	demonstrate	 its	
























	 J.	 Armour	 and	 L.	 Enriques,	 “The	 Promise	 and	 Perils	 of	 Crowdfunding:	 Between	 Corporate	 Finance	 and	
Consumer	Contracts”	(2018)	81(1)	M.L.R.	51.	The	Financial	Conduct	Authority	are	also	now	taking	various	steps	
in	respect	of	crowdfunding	platforms.	For	instance,	they	consider	certain	forms	of	crowdfunding—loan-based	
crowdfunding	 and	 investment-based	 crowdfunding—as	 regulated	 activities	 under	 the	 Financial	 Services	 and	
Markets	Act	2000.	








past	 century	 saw	a	 gradual	 liberalisation	on	 third-party	 funding	 for	 litigation.
41
	 Jackson	 LJ	







be	 drawn	 between	 “investment-based”	 crowdfunding	 models,	 where	 investors	 have	 a	





review	 claims	 and	 are	 particularly	 prominent:	 CrowdJustice	 and	 the	 Good	 Law	 Project.	
CrowdJustice	 offers	 a	 platform	 for	 case	 owners	 (those	 seeking	 funding)	 to	 publicise	 and	
fundraise	for	a	prospective	case.	Case	owners,	with	support	 from	CrowdJustice,	develop	a	
webpage	setting	out	details	of	the	case	for	which	funding	is	sought,	a	target	amount,	and	a	
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rata	 refund.	 CrowdJustice	 does	 not	 offer	 any	 legal	 advice.	 All	 information	 about	 the	 case	
comes	from	the	case	owners	and	their	lawyers.		
The	Good	Law	Project	was	founded	by	its	Director,	Jolyon	Maugham	QC—a	successful	


















avoidance	 (valued	 at	 around	 £1bn)	 and	 a	 challenge	 to	 the	 Electoral	 Commission’s	
investigation	 into	 Vote	 Leave’s	 spending	 returns,	 the	 latter	 arguing	 that	 the	 Electoral	
Commission’s	investigation	applied	the	wrong	test	of	law	and	was	inadequate	on	the	facts.		
Both	 CrowdJustice	 and	 the	 Good	 Law	 Project	 have	 taken	 a	 different	 approach	 to	
vetting	 prospective	 claims,	 to	 try	 to	 ensure	 that	 they	 are	 supporting	 meritorious	 cases.	














	 The	 legal	 argument	 was	 outlined	 in	 N.	 Barber,	 T.	 Hickman	 and	 J.	 King,	 “Pulling	 the	 Article	 50	 ‘Trigger’:	
Parliament’s	 Indispensable	 Role”	 (June	 27	 2016)	 UK	 Constitutional	 Law	 Blog,	
https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/06/27/nick-barber-tom-hickman-and-jeff-king-pulling-the-article-50-
trigger-parliaments-indispensable-role/	[Accessed	February	22,	2018].	
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various	strikes	by	 junior	doctors	and	 led	to	the	first	all-out	strike	 in	NHS	history.	Green	J.,	
sitting	 in	 the	 High	 Court,	 concluded	 that	Mr.	 Hunt	 had	 acted	 “squarely”	 within	 his	 legal	
powers.	The	claimants	also	argued	that	Mr	Hunt’s	approach	lacked	clarity	and	transparency,	
and	that	it	was	irrational	to	contend	that	imposing	the	contract	would	improve	weekend	care.	




affected	 by	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 contract.”
50



















































must	 be	 taken	 to	 ensure	 that	 focus	 is	 now	 directed	 only	 on	 high-profile,	 successful	
crowdfunding	campaigns	which	may,	in	reality,	the	be	exception	to	the	usual	result.	
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	 Finally,	it	should	be	note	that	cost	capping	appears	to	be	]	an	important	part	of	the	
evolving	 practice	 around	 crowdfunding.	 Costs	 capping	 orders	 (and	 their	 judge-made	
predecessors,	 protective	 costs	 orders)	 are	 sought	 and	 made	 at	 an	 early	 stage	 in	 the	








permission	 to	 apply	 for	 judicial	 review	 has	 been	 granted;	 the	 court	 is	 satisfied	 that	 the	
proceedings	are	public	interest	proceedings;	and	the	court	is	satisfied	that,	without	a	costs	
capping	 order,	 the	 applicant	 would	 be	 acting	 reasonably	 by	 withdrawing	 or	 ceasing	 to	
participate	in	the	proceedings.	Proceedings	are	considered	“public	interest	proceedings”	only	
if:	an	issue	that	is	the	subject	of	the	proceedings	is	of	general	public	importance;	the	public	











required	 that	 any	 application	 for	 a	 costs	 capping	 order	 is	 supported	 by	 evidence	 of	 the	





means	 and	 its	 appears	 to	 be	 the	 case	 that	 crowdfunded	 claimants	 do	 seek	 such	 orders	
routinely.	 Recently,	 Cheema-Grubb	 J	 granted	 a	 cost	 capping	 order	 for	 a	 judicial	 review	
brought	by	five	claimants,	including	Professor	Stephen	Hawking,	challenging	the	lawfulness	

























against	a	backdrop	of	 the	 claimants	 raising	nearly	£265,000	via	 crowdfunding	and	private	
donations,	meaning	the	ruling	enabled	relatively	substantial	funds	to	meet	the	costs	of	the	
claimants’	 lawyers.	 We	 are,	 with	 cases	 such	 as	 this,	 witnessing	 the	 start	 of	 practices	












	 At	 the	 outset,	 it	 must	 be	 observed	 that	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 crowdfunding	 models	 do	






already	has	a	 strong	place	within	 the	public	 consciousness,	gains	media	 traction,	or	has	a	
specialist	(and	preferably	not	poor)	set	of	supporters,	it	may	be	the	case	that	some	level	of	
                                                
61
	 R.	 (on	 the	 application	 of	 Hawking)	 v	 Secretary	 of	 State	 for	 Health	 and	 Social	 Care	 (22	 February	 2018,	
unreported).	A	costs	cap	was	initially	refused	by	Mr	Justice	Peter	Walker,	when	he	granted	permission. 
62






































to	 information	 provided	 under	 section	 85	when	 it	 is	 “determining	 by	whom	and	 to	what	











“consider	 whether	 to	 order	 costs	 to	 be	 paid	 by	 a	 person,	 other	 the	 proceedings,	 who	 is	




85	 and	 86	 sections	 are	 not	 yet	 in	 force,	 but	 are	 alluded	 to	 in	 CrowdJustice’s	 terms	 and	
conditions,	under	the	heading	“Risks	of	Funding	Litigation”:	
	
“In	 our	 view	UK	 case	 law	 indicates	 that	 pure	 funders	 –	 Backers	who	don’t	 have	 a	











[their]	 contribution	 (whether	 financial	 or	 otherwise)	 does	 not	 entitle	 [them]	 to	 have,	 any	
rights	in	or	to	any	Case,	including	any	ownership,	control	or	rights	to	advise	on	the	conduct	
or	legal	strategy	of	a	Case.”	The	purpose	of	this	clause	appears	to	be	to	minimise	the	risk	that	







be	 considered	authentic.	 In	other	words,	how	many	donors	are	needed	 for	 there	 to	be	a	
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“donors”	 or	 “backers”).	 Perry	 therefore	 recommends	 that	 in	 non-investment	 based	
crowdfunding	models,	claims	should	be	subject	to	a	professional	vetting	process	to	minimise	
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uses	the	resources	of	 its	Director	for	this	purpose.	 It	 is	unclear	what	vetting	standards	are	
operating	across	the	crowdfunding	“community”	as	a	whole.	
Generally	 speaking,	 the	 possible	 change	 in	 the	 vetting	 processes	 used	 raises	 the	
prospect	of	 a	 very	different	breed	of	 PIL	 to	 that	which	 the	UK	 is	 familiar	with,	which	 are	
typically	 brought	 by	 organisations	 with	 expertise	 in	 public	 law	 litigation	 (e.g.	 Liberty	 or	
JUSTICE)	 or	 some	 specialist	 policy	 area	 (e.g.	Greenpeace).	 Traditionally,	 litigation—being	
perceived	as	complex	and	risky—has	been	approached	carefully	by	many	organisations.	One	
upshot	is	that	the	same	few	organisations	appear	again	and	again	on	the	headnotes	of	judicial	



















But	 tax	 law	 is	 a	 very	 different	 beast	 to	 public	 interest	 judicial	 review.	 This	 is	 something	
Maugham	freely	admits,	acknowledging	that	“organisations	in	the	UK	that	have	a	far	longer	
history	of	engagement	in	the	cause	lawyering	field”	than	himself	and	that	this	means,	in	his	














resources	 from	 crowdfunding	 can	 lead	 to	 an	 opening	 up	 of	 who	 can	 lead	 PIL.	 These	
organisations,	 when	 considering	 and	 conducting	 PIL,	 have	 generally	 been	 responsive	 to	




and,	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 traditional	 organisational	 structure,	 transfer	 more	 power	 to	 the	


















bono	 work	 ultimately	 supports	 an	 ill-designed	 system	 through	 good	 deeds.	 If	 there	 are	
crowdfunding	successes,	governments	in	the	future	might	choose	to	lean	on	such	“successes”	
to	prompt	otherwise	 restrictive	 reform	 in	 the	area.	There	 is,	 to	be	clear,	not	an	ounce	of	
systematic	evidence	that	crowdfunding	somehow	fills	the	gap	left	by	recent	reductions	in	the	











“The	 Costs	 of	 Civil	 Justice	 and	Who	 Pays”	 (2017)	 37(3)	 O.J.L.S.	 687.	 There	 is	 also	 a	 powerful	 argument	 for	
considering	judicial	review	costs	as	distinct	from	standard	civil	disputes,	see	M.	Fordham,	“Rethinking	Costs	in	
Judicial	Review”	 [2009]	 J.R.	306;	R	 (Davey)	v	Aylesbury	Vale	District	Council	 [2007]	EWCA	Civ	1166;	 [2008]	1	
W.L.R.	878	[18]	(Sedley	LJ).	










“government	 would	 simply	 disobey.”
81







“clamping	 down”	 does	 not	 have	 to	 be	 directed	 at	 the	 judiciary	 but	 can	 be	 aimed	 at	
discouraging	 particular	 claimants	 or	 groups.	 In	 that	 text—published	 in	 1992—it	 was	
suggested	that	the	UK	government	might	move	to	clamp	down	on	judicial	review.	Among	the	
possibilities	discussed	then	were:	direct	steps	to	exclude	claims,	e.g.	through	ouster	clauses;	





aside	 from	 the	 costs	 and	 funding	 issues	 discussed	 above,	 there	 have	 been	 many	 other	
instances.
84
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that	 common	 law	principles	with	baked-in	hostility	 follow.	The	mere	presence	and	use	of	
crowdfunding	 platform	 may	 also	 generate	 a—possibly	 very	 unhelpful	 and	 unrealistic—
expectation	that	claimants	seek	to	fundraise	 independently.	Of	course,	the	opposite	could	








Crowdfunding	 of	 PIL	 can	 perhaps	 avoid	 the	 “ethical	 arguments”	 that	 investment-
based	crowd	funders	often	face,	i.e.	that	they	are	in	it	to	get	rich.	In	judicial	review,	there	is	
likely	to	be	no	immediate	“pot	of	gold”	to	be	seized	by	taking	a	case,	thereby	alleviating	any	











help	 with	 funding	 a	 case.	 But	 crowdfunding	 is	 more	 than	 simply	 the	 digitalisation	 of	 an	
existing	 practice.	 Though	 it	 may	 be	 able	 to	 claim	 its	 heritage	 is	 in	 informal	 community	
fundraising	 initiatives,	 crowdfunding	 is	 qualitatively	 different	 in	 multiple	 respects.	 For	
instance,	the	fact	the	fundraising	takes	place	online	means	it	is	more	widely	accessible	and	
that	 fundraising	campaigns	are	 likely	 to	be	more	widely	circulated.	Similar,	 campaigns	are	
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perhaps	 more	 likely	 to	 become	 a	 national	 political	 issue	 or	 be	 connected	 to	 an	 existing	
national	issue.	This	may	be	beneficial	in	many	respects,	but	it	is	still	a	substantial	difference.	
The	use	of	online	systems	also	creates	a	new,	important	actor:	the	platform	that	hosts	the	
campaigns.	 Platforms	 such	 as	 CrowdJustice	 are	 now	 key	 players	 in	 this	 area	 and	 possess	
power	to	affect	how	fundraising	campaigns	operate.	The	centralisation	of	this	task	therefore	









despite	 its	 possible	 flaws	 and	 consequences,	 and	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 provide	 litigation	
funding	where	 there	otherwise	 is	none.	The	next	challenge	 is	devising	an	approach	which	
optimises	 its	benefits	while	minimising	 risk.	 In	other	words,	 to	create	a	practical	ethics	of	
crowdfunding	 in	 the	 judicial	 review	 context.
88
	 The	 demand	 for	 this	 is,	 in	 many	 ways,	
exemplified	 by	 Jo	 Maugham	 QC’s	 reflections	 on	 his	 experiences	 of	 the	 practice	 of	







all	of	 these	actors	ought	 to	act	carefully	and	ethically	 in	respect	of	crowdfunding,	 lawyers	
seem	the	best	to	orientate	a	practical	ethical	code	on	crowdfunding	towards.	 It	 is	 lawyers	
who	wield	the	most	significant	amount	of	power	in	the	bringing	and	conduct	of	crowdfunded	
PIL.	Platforms	often	use	lawyers	as	the	vetting	mechanism	for	cases	too.	In	addition,	lawyers	




















	 These	 codes—though	 often	 framed	 in	 the	 language	 of	 “duties”—are	 broad	




but	soft	 framework	principles	that	are	designed	to	help	those	 involved	 in	 legal	practice	to	
work	through	challenges	which	arise	in	the	course	of	their	work.	Some	of	the	principles,	such	









the	 crowdfunding	 activities	 of	 legal	 professionals—or	 legal	 professionals	 involved	 in	
crowdfunded	litigation—ought	not	to	be	subject	to	guidance	of	this	kind.	It	could	be	argued	
that	it	is	best	to	leave	this	area	of	legal	practice	unregulated	and	lawyers	ought	to	be	able	to	
navigate	 their	 way	 through	 crowdfunding	 litigation	 themselves,	 relying	 out	 the	 general	
principles	of	legal	practice	ethics.	However,	such	a	view	would	fail	to	properly	take	account	
of	the	very	real	and	particular	risks	presented	by	crowdfunding.	Moreover,	it	is	clear—merely	
from	 examining	 common	 high-profile	 examples	 of	 crowdfunded	 PIL,	 such	 as	 the	 junior	
doctors’	case,	Webster,	and	litigation	by	the	Good	Law	Project—that	lawyers	are	taking	very	
different	approaches	 to	conducting	cases.	For	 instance,	 the	approach	 to	 the	extent	which	
skeleton	arguments	and	other	key	litigation	documents	are	disclosed	via	the	crowdfunding	






















range	 of	 actors	 involved.	 At	 minimum,	 it	 seems	 important	 to	 involve	 judges,	 lawyers	
(especially	 those	 experienced	 with	 crowdfunding),	 regulators,	 charities	 (again,	 especially	


















same	 time,	 it	 is	 hoped	 that	 all	 actors	 involved	 in	 crowdfunding	 judicial	 reviews	 consider	
closely	what	their	responsibilities	are.	
  
